







Discussion Paper No.582 
 
















KIER DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES Trade with Heterogeneous Multiple Priors∗
Atsushi Kajii









This paper presents a general framework to understand the possibility of a purely
speculative trade under asymmetric information, where the decision making rule of
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where the minimum is taken over the set of posteriors. In this framework, we derive
a necessary and suﬃcient condition on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the
updating rules adopted by the agents, for non-existence of trade such that it is al-
ways common knowledge that every agent expects a positive gain.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: C70, D81, D82, D84.
Key words: multiple priors; no trade; dynamic consistency; interim eﬃciency; rect-
angularity.
∗We thank seminar participants at Stanford University for valuable comments and discussions. Kajii
acknowledges ﬁnancial support by MEXT, Grant-in-Aid for 21st Century COE Program. Ui acknowl-
edges ﬁnancial support by MEXT, Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper presents a general framework to understand the possibility of a purely specu-
lative trade under asymmetric information, where the decision making rule of each trader
conforms to the multiple priors model (Gibloa and Schmeidler, 1989): the agents are in-
terested in the minimum of the conditional expected value of trade where the minimum
is taken over the set of posteriors. In this framework, we derive a necessary and suﬃcient
condition on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the updating rules adopted by the
agents, for non-existence of interim agreeable trade, i.e., trade such that it is always
common knowledge that every agent expects a positive gain.
The condition is closely related to the existence of a common prior in the single prior
model, and thus our results give an insight about the role of a “common set of priors” in
the multiple prior model. Since the model in this paper is an extension of the standard
Bayesian trading model initiated by Milgrom and Stokey (1982), our results can be seen
as a generalization of results obtained by Morris (1995) and Feinberg (2000), further
elaborated by Samet (1998) and Ng (2003).
A simple analogy to the standard Bayesian model might suggest that the existence of
a common prior, i.e., the non-emptiness of the intersection of agents’ sets of priors, would
imply non-existence of interim agreeable trade. Indeed, as is characterized by Billot et
al. (2000), this is basically the case for ex ante agreeable trade. But for the interim trade
agreement, the problem is more subtle. Even in the standard Bayesian model with a
single prior, as is shown in the above literature, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
no interim agreeable trade is weaker than the common prior assumption; the condition
is that the posteriors of the traders are consistent with some (ﬁctitious) common prior.
In our model of multiple priors, however, the issue is more complicated, since there are
many possible ways to update multiple priors upon arrival of private information. We
consider a collection of all (ﬁctitious) priors consistent with the posteriors and call it a
maximal rectangular prior set. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for non-existence
of interim agreeable trade is that the intersection of these sets is non-empty.
Non-existence of purely speculative trade in general non-expected utility frameworks,
including multiple prior models, with asymmetric information has been studied by Dow
et al. (1990), Ma (2001), and Halevy (2004), so let us clarify our contribution with
respect to these works. These papers were intended to characterize the condition on the
2ex ante preference relation which ensures the non-existence of interim agreeable trade for
any information structure. The condition Ma (2001) and Halevy (2004) found for this
purpose is essentially the weak decomposability axiom studied by Grant et al. (2000),
which leads to a dynamically consistent decision making rule.
In contrast to these papers, we concentrate on multiple priors models. Since the weak
decomposability is typically not satisﬁed for this class of models, one might think that
our results are inconsistent with the aforementioned results. The key diﬀerence is that
we assume a ﬁxed information structure, and hence our condition on the set of possible
posteriors is relative to the ﬁxed information structure.
As a matter of fact, the reader will see that the dynamic consistency is relevant in our
condition as well, and the relevant concept is the rectangularity introduced by Epstein
and Schneider (2003) and Wakai (2002).1 Wakai (2002) showed that the rectangularity is
suﬃcient for no trade. Thus our main contribution is the necessity part of the argument,
especially the necessity of a common prior. But we also contend that our formulation,
inspired by a beautiful paper of Samet (1998), is much simpler but captures the essence of
the problem. In particular, our approach clariﬁes the precise role of dynamic consistency
in the analysis.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
summarizes basic known results. Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 discusses
t h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fo u rr e s u l t si nc o m p a r i s o n with those in the standard Bayesian model.
Section 5 contains examples.
2S e t u p
We consider the following information structure for a ﬁnite number of agents, who are
allowed to have multiple posteriors.
• Ω = {1,...,n}:aﬁnite set of states.
• ∆(Ω)={p ∈ RΩ : p(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω,
P
ω∈Ω p(ω)=1 }: the set of probability
distributions over Ω. A generic element of ∆(Ω)i sd e n o t e db yp =( p(1),...,p(n)).
For E ⊆ Ω,w ew r i t ep(E)f o r
P
ω∈E p(ω).
1We adopt the term “rectangularity” from Epstein and Schneider (2003).
3• p(·|E): the conditional probability given E over Ω when p(E) > 0f o rp ∈ ∆(Ω).
That is, p(A|E)=p(A ∩ E)/p(E)f o rA,E ⊆ Ω.I f p(E) = 0, let p(·|E)b ea n
arbitrary element of ∆(Ω).
•P=2 ∆(Ω)\∅: a collection of all non-empty subsets of ∆(Ω).
•I= {1,...,I}:aﬁnite set of agents. For each i ∈ I,
— Πi is an information partition of Ω for agent i,a n dΠi(ω) is the partition
element containing ω ∈ Ω.Ag e n e r i ce l e m e n to fΠi is denoted by πi.
— Φi : Πi → P is a function such that:
∗ p(πi) = 1 for all p ∈ Φi(πi)a n dπi ∈ Πi,
∗ Φi(πi) is closed and non-empty for all πi ∈ Πi.
We refer to the function Φi as a posterior function of agent i ∈ I.
Deﬁnition 1 We call hΩ,I,{Πi}i∈I,{Φi}i∈Ii an information structure with multiple
posteriors.
In our setup, we take posteriors rather than priors as primitives. The posterior
function is intended to describe the beliefs of agent i ∈ I after a partition element πi ∈ Πi
is observed. A natural case of course will be where the posterior function is derived from
an updating rule operated on a set of priors (cf. Gibloa and Schmeidler, 1993). We shall
list below a couple of standard updating rules. Let Pi ∈ P be a non-empty, closed set
such that {p ∈ Pi : p(πi) > 0} 6= ∅ for all πi ∈ Πi and i ∈ I.
1. The full Bayesian updating (FB-updating) on Pi:
Φi (πi): ={p(·|πi):p(πi) > 0,p ∈ Pi}.
2. The maximum likelihood updating (ML-updating) on Pi:
Φi (πi): ={p(·|πi):p(πi)=m a x
p0∈Pi
p0 (πi)}.
The standard Bayesian model corresponds to the case where Pi is a singleton for every
agent. When Pi is a singleton, the derived posterior functions in the above examples
4coincide trivially, and they are convex valued. It is easy to check that Φi(πi) is a closed
set for the ML-updating rule. For the FB-updating rule, if minp∈Pi p(πi) > 0, Φi(πi)i s
closed.
Alternatively, one can start with a given posterior function and ask what set of priors
will be compatible with it, and this is the path we shall pursue in this paper. First of
all, a minimal Bayesian consistency requirement is that any point in Φi(πi) should be a
conditional probability of some priors in the prior set.
Deﬁnition 2 A prior set Pi ∈ P is said to be compatible with Φi if, for any πi ∈ Πi
and p ∈ Φi(πi), there exists p0 ∈ Pi with p0 (·|πi)=p.Ap r i o rs e tPi ∈ P is said to be
fully compatible with Φi if Pi is compatible with Φi and p ∈ Pi with p(πi) > 0i m p l i e s
p(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi) for any πi ∈ Πi.
To put if diﬀerently, Pi ∈ P is compatible with Φi if and only if {p(·|πi):p(πi) >
0,p ∈ Pi} ⊇ Φi(πi) for all πi ∈ Πi;a n dPi ∈ P is fully compatible with Φi if and only if
{p(·|πi):p(πi) > 0,p ∈ Pi} = Φi(πi) for all πi ∈ Πi.







where the summation is the Minkowski sum. The inclusion above may be strict in
general. A stronger consistency requirement below, introduced by Epstein and Schneider
(2003) and Wakai (2002), asks for the equality:








To sum up, we have introduced three progressively stronger Bayesian consistency
requirements for prior sets: compatibly, full compatibility, and rectangularity. See Ex-
ample 1 in Section 5 which illustrates the diﬀerences of the three requirements.
We summarize below the relationship between the three Bayesian consistency re-
quirements and the FB-updating or the ML-updating.
5Lemma 1 The following claims are true:
• If Φi is the ML-updating on Pi,t h e nPi is compatible with Φi.
• Φi i st h eF B - u p d a t i n go nPi if and only if Pi is fully compatible with Φi.
• If Pi is rectangular, then the FB-updating and the ML-updating coincide.
Proof.T h eﬁrst and second claims are apparent. We prove the last claim. Pick any
ˆ πi ∈ Πi and ﬁxa n yp∗ ∈ Pi with p∗ (ˆ πi)=m a x p0∈Pi p0 (ˆ πi). For any p ∈ Pi such
that p(πi) > 0f o rπi ∈ Πi with p∗(πi) > 0, by the deﬁnition of rectangularity, ¯ p :=
P
πi∈Πi p∗(πi)p(·|πi) ∈ Pi.S o¯ p(·|ˆ πi)=p(·|ˆ πi) is obtained by the ML updating on Pi.



















Then, Pi is rectangular with Φi. Conversely, any rectangular prior set Pi can be written of





For given Φi,d e ﬁne a rectangular prior set P∗



















We shall refer to P∗
i as the maximal rectangular prior set because P∗
i is maximal in the
collection of all rectangular prior set ordered by the set inclusion relation. The set P∗
i
will play an important role in the main result. We have the following properties of P∗
i :
• Φi(πi) ⊆ P∗
i for each πi ∈ Πi; consider q ∈ ∆(Ω)w i t hq (πi) = 1 in (3).
• p ∈ P∗
i if and only if p(πi) > 0i m p l i e sp(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi) by (3).
• From (1) and (3), P∗
i is the collection of all probability distributions over Ω con-
tained in some prior set fully compatible with Φi.I n p a r t i c u l a r , i f Pi is fully
compatible with Φi,t h e nPi ⊆ P∗
i .
6• If Φi is singleton-valued, P∗
i is the set of all priors which generates the posteriors
given by Φi in the standard sense. In other words, if
T
i∈I P∗
i 6= ∅, then the
posteriors are consistent in the sense of Harsanyi (1967—1968).
• P∗
i is closed (and hence compact) since Φi(πi) is closed for all πi ∈ Πi.
For f ∈ RΩ and i ∈ I,l e t
Eif(ω)= m i n
p∈Φi(Πi(ω))
p · f (4)
where p · f =
P
ω∈Ω p(ω)f(ω). That is, Ei assigns the smallest conditional expected
value of f at ω. Similarly, we write
E0
i f =m i n
p∈Pi
p · f (5)
when the reference to the prior set Pi is clear from the context: E0
i f is the smallest
expected value.
We consider a collection of functions {fi ∈ RΩ}i∈I with
P
i∈I fi = 0. We interpret
a function fi as a ﬁnancial asset; when ω ∈ Ω is realized, agent i ∈ I who owns fi
receives the value of fi(ω). Assume that the initial position of each agent is neutral: he
receives 0 regardless of ω. Since we require
P
i∈I fi = 0, the collection {fi}i∈I can be
understood as a trade arrangement. Now if agent i with a posterior function Φi adopts
the very pessimistic decision rule of maximizing the minimum expected value (Gibloa
and Schmeidler, 1989), then the agent is willing to accept fi at ω if Eifi(ω) > 0. Thus,
if Eifi(ω) > 0 for every i ∈ I, we shall deem that a trade arrangement {fi}i∈I where
agent i ∈ I receives fi is interim agreeable to all agents. Similarly, an ex ante agreement
can be deﬁned. We discuss the relationship between them in Section 4.3.
For the case of a single prior, Samet (1998) showed the following result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Φi(πi) is a singleton for all πi ∈ Πi and i ∈ I.L e tP∗
i be
the maximal rectangular prior set for i ∈ I.T h e n
T
i∈I P∗
i 6= ∅ if and only if there exists
no {fi ∈ RΩ}i∈I with
P








that Φi(πi)={p(·|πi)} for all πi ∈ Πi and i ∈ I if p(πi) > 0, or {Φi}i∈I is consistent
in the sense of Harsanyi (1967—1968). Thus, the proposition says that there exists a
common prior if and only if there exists no interim agreeable trade arrangement.
7Let δE ∈ RΩ be an indicator function of E ⊆ Ω such that δE(ω)=1i fω ∈ E and
δE(ω) = 0 otherwise. Note that EiδE(ω) is a posterior probability of E ⊆ Ω held by
agent i ∈ I at ω ∈ Ω. As a corollary of Proposition 1, we have the agreement theorem
of Aumann (1976).2




and EiδE(ω) is constant over all ω ∈ Ω for all i ∈ I,t h e nEiδE(ω)=EjδE(ω) for all
i,j ∈ I.
Samet (1998) showed the following separation theorem of many convex sets in a
simplex in order to show the above results.
Lemma 2 Let K1,...,K I be convex, closed, subsets of ∆(Ω).T h e n ,
TI
i=1 Ki = ∅ if an
only if there are f1,...,f I ∈ RΩ such that
PI
i=1 fi =0and xi · fi > 0 for each xi ∈ Ki,
for i =1 ,...,I.
3R e s u l t s
Let us ﬁrst provide a result which relates the conditional expectation and the uncondi-
tional expectation with the Bayesian consistency requirements.
Lemma 3 Let c ∈ R. (i) Let Pi be fully compatible with Φi for i ∈ I.T h e n ,p · f>c
for all p ∈ Pi if Eif(ω) >cfor all ω ∈ Ω. (ii) Let P∗
i be the maximal rectangular prior
set for i ∈ I.T h e n ,p · f>cfor all p ∈ P∗
i if and only if Eif(ω) >cfor all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof.L e tPi be fully compatible with Φi. Suppose that Eif(ω)=m i n p∈Φi(Πi(ω)) p·f>c
for all ω ∈ Ω.P i c k a n y q ∈ Pi. Note that q =
P
πi∈Πi q(πi)q (·|πi). For each πi ∈ Πi
with q(πi) > 0, full compatibility implies that q(·|πi) ∈ Φi(πi) and thus q (·|πi) · f ≥
minp∈Φi(πi) p·f>c .T h e r e f o r e ,q·f =
P
πi∈Πi q(πi)(q (·|πi)·f) >c , which establishes (i).
For (ii), if p · f>cfor all p ∈ P∗
i ,w eh a v eEif(ω)=m i n p∈Φi(Πi(ω)) p · f>cfor
all ω ∈ Ω since Φi (Πi(ω)) ⊆ P∗
i for all ω ∈ Ω. The converse also holds because of full
compatibility of P∗
i .
2We can replace Ω with a common knowledge event in Proposition 1. The condition that Eifi(ω) > 0
for all i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω can be re-stated that “a positive gain from trade is common knowledge” at
ω ∈ Ω. Corollary 1 can be modiﬁed analogously.
8T h ec o n v e r s eo f( i )d o e sn o th o l de v e ni fPi is rectangular. See Example 1 in Section 5.
W er e p o r to u rm a i nr e s u l t sw h i c he x t e n dP roposition 1 and Corollary 1 to the case
where Φi(πi) is not a singleton.
Proposition 2 Let P∗
i be the maximal rectangular prior set for i ∈ I and let co(P∗
i ) be
its convex hull. Then,
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅ if and only if there exists no {fi ∈ RΩ}i∈I with
P
i∈I fi =0such that Eifi(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω,f o ri ∈ I.
Proof. Since co(P∗
i ) is convex and closed for each i ∈ I,b yL e m m a2 ,
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅
if and only if there are no f1,...,f I ∈ RΩ such that
P
i∈I fi = 0 and pi ·fi > 0f o re a c h
pi ∈ co(P∗
i ), for i ∈ I. Note that pi ·fi > 0f o re a c hpi ∈ co(P∗
i )i fa n do n l yi fpi ·fi > 0
for each pi ∈ P∗

















ci =m i n
p∈Φi(Πi(ω))
p(E)=EiδE(ω), ci =m a x
p∈Φi(Πi(ω))
p(E)=−Ei(−δE)(ω)
for i ∈ I. We show that ci ≤ cj.
Suppose that I = {1,2}.I fcj <c i with i 6= j,l e tfi = δE −c and fj = c−δE where
cj <c<c i. Then, Eifi(ω) > 0a n dEjfj(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, which contradicts to
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅. Thus, we must have ci ≤ cj.
Suppose that I = {1,...,I} with I ≥ 3. If cj <c i with i 6= j,l e tfi = δE − ci,
fj = cj − δE, fk =( ci − cj)/(I − 2) for k 6= i,j where cj <c j <c i <c i. Then,
Eifi(ω) > 0 for all i ∈ I, which contradicts to
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅. Thus, we must have
ci ≤ cj, completing the proof.
94 Discussions
We discuss three important diﬀerences between Proposition 1 with singleton-valued pos-
terior functions and Proposition 2 with general posterior functions.
4.1 On the existence of common priors sets
If Φi is singleton-valued, the implication of
T
i∈I P∗
i 6= ∅ is clear, as we have already
discussed: the agents look as if they share a common prior from the observer’s point of
view. The common prior assumption is necessary and suﬃcient for the interim no trade,
i.e., non-existence of interim agreeable trade, by Proposition 1.








i ) 6= ∅.
Lemma 4 Let Pi ∈ P for i ∈ I and let co(Pi) be its convex hull. If
T
i∈I co(Pi) 6= ∅
and Pi is fully compatible with Φi for all i ∈ I,t h e n
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅.
Proof.S i n c ePi is fully compatible with Φi,w eh a v ePi ⊆ P∗







i∈I co(Pi) 6= ∅.
For example, suppose that Φi is derived from the FB-updating on Pi and Pi = Pj
for all i,j ∈ I. That is, there exists a “common prior set” P ∈ P fully compatible
with Φi for all i ∈ I.3 Then, trivially,
T
i∈I co(Pi) 6= ∅. Thus, by Lemma 4, we have
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅, and by Proposition 2, there are no interim agreeable trade arrange-
m e n t si fm i n p∈Pi p(πi) > 0 and thus Φi(πi)i sc l o s e d . 4
If “full compatibility” is replaced by “compatibility” in the lemma, the consequence
of the lemma may not be true in general. Remember that if Φi is the FB-updating, then
Pi is fully compatible with Φi,w h i l ei fΦi is the ML-updating, then Pi is compatible with
Φi, but not necessarily fully compatible with Φi. Thus, the ML-updating may result in
3As we have pointed out in Lemma 1, the ML-updating and the FB-updating coincide if Pi is rect-
angular. So the discussion here is readily extended to the ML-updating if the rectangularity is satisﬁed.
4A similar result can be obtained even if we replace the assumption of minp∈Pi p(πi) > 0w i t h
maxp∈Pi p(πi) > 0b yd e ﬁning the FB-updating rule in terms of the closure of that in the original
deﬁnition: Φi (πi): =C l{p(·|πi):p(πi) > 0,p ∈ P}.
10T
i∈I co(P∗
i )=∅ even if every agent has a common prior set. For such an example, see
Example 2 in Section 5.
On the other hand, as far as full compatibility is retained,
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅ may hold
even if
T
i∈I Pi = ∅, but
T
i∈I co(Pi) 6= ∅. Such an example is found in Example 3 in
Section 5.
To sum up, if Φi is not singleton-valued, the “common prior set” assumption with
full compatibility of the prior set is suﬃcient for the interim no trade, but not necessary.
Even the empty intersection of agents’ prior sets may result in non-existence of interim
agreeable trade. Thus, it is not the case that, for the non-existence of interim agreeable
trade, the agents must behave as if they have a common set of multiple priors.
4.2 Uncertainty aversion: the role of zero endowment assumption
We have assumed that the initial position of each agent is neutral, i.e., the endowments
of ﬁnancial assets are zero. When Φi is singleton-valued, the zero endowment assumption
is not restrictive. If Φi(πi) is a singleton for all πi ∈ Πi,t h e nEi is a linear operator: for
all f,g ∈ RΩ, Eif(ω)− Eig(ω)=Ei(f −g)(ω). Thus, we have the following claim as an
immediate consequence of Proposition 1:
Corollary 3 Suppose that Φi(πi) is a singleton for all πi ∈ Πi and i ∈ I.F i x a n y
{gi ∈ RΩ}i∈I with
P




i 6= ∅; (ii) There exists no {fi ∈ RΩ}i∈I with
P
i∈I fi =0such that Eifi(ω) >
Eigi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω,f o ri ∈ I.
To interpret, think of {gi}i∈I as an initial arrangement of trade: gi (ω) is the amount
agent i r e c e i v e si fs t a t eω is realized. Imagine that an alternative trading arrangement
{fi}i∈I is proposed to the agents. Then, the condition for {fi}i∈I in (ii) means that
{fi}i∈I is deemed desirable to all the agents at any state ω ∈ Ω. Roughly speaking,
there cannot be a mutually beneﬁcial trade when the agents know that the environment
is zero-sum if and only if there exists a common prior, for any initial arrangement of
trade.
However, the same logic does not extend to thec a s eo fm u l t i p l ep r i o r s ,i . e . ,t h ez e r o




i ) 6= ∅, there may exist two trade arrangements {fi}i∈I and {gi}i∈I with
P
i∈I fi = 0 and
P
i∈I gi =0s u c ht h a tEifi(ω) >E igi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω,f o ri ∈ I.
11We shall give an example in Example 4 of Section 5, but let us ﬁrst discuss why this
is the case. Mathematically, this occurs because of concavity of the operator Ei which
is the minimum of linear operators given by priors. In terms of economics, because of
“uncertainty aversion” of traders, there can be an agreeable trade arrangement {fi}i∈I
over {gi}i∈I which may reduce “uncertainty” of trade {gi}i∈I for all the traders. Thus
even if there is a common understanding on the priors set, the environment starting with
{gi}i∈I is not necessarily zero-sum. Thus in such a case, trading on private information
should not be deemed purely speculative to begin with.
As one can expect, a no trade result similar to Corollary 3 is obtained as a straight-
forward corollary to Proposition 2 if {gi}i∈I are assumed to be constant; by construction,
there is no “uncertainty” in trade {gi}i∈I if it is constant and thus Eif(ω) − Eig(ω)=
Ei(f − g)(ω) holds.
Corollary 4 Fix any ci ∈ R for i ∈ I with
P
i∈I ci =0 . Then the following two
conditions are equivalent: (i)
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅; (ii) There exists no {fi ∈ RΩ}i∈I with
P
i∈I fi =0such that Eifi(ω) >c i for all ω ∈ Ω,f o ri ∈ I.
4.3 Eﬃciency and dynamic consistency
We have considered non-existence of interim agreeable trade. In this subsection, we
study its relation with non-existence of ex ante agreeable trade. More precisely, we
consider whether ex ante eﬃciency implies interim eﬃciency (cf. Milgrom and Stokey,
1982), which is the issue of dynamic consistency.
Let a prior set Pi ∈ P be given and Φi be a posterior function derived from some
updating rule on Pi. To study ax ante eﬃciency and interim eﬃciency of trade arrange-
ments, we restrict our attention to trade arrangements with bounded volumes:
T = {{fi ∈ RΩ}i∈I :
X
i∈I
fi =0 ,b i ≤ fi ≤ bi for all i ∈ I},
where bi < 0 < bi for every i ∈ I. As before, we write
E0
i f =m i n
p∈Pi
p · f
for i ∈ I. We say that:
12•{ fi}i∈I ∈ T is ex ante eﬃcient in T if there exists no {gi}i∈I ∈ T such that
E0
i gi >E 0
i fi for all i ∈ I.
•{ fi}i∈I ∈ T is interim eﬃcient in T if there exists no {gi}i∈I ∈ T such that
Eigi(ω) >E ifi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ I.
Since T is compact, both an ex ante eﬃcient trade arrangement and an interim eﬃcient
trade arrangement exist.
As a bench mark, let us ﬁrst recall the case of a single prior, where the expected





Eif(ω) × pi (ω). (6)
where pi ∈ ∆(Ω)i sap r i o rf o ri ∈ I.A si sw e l lk n o w n ,e xa n t ee ﬃciency implies interim
eﬃciency in this case.
For the case of multiple priors, the relation between ex ante eﬃciency and interim
eﬃciency is more delicate. As Dow et al. (1990) demonstrated, it is known that ex
ante eﬃciency does not necessarily imply interim eﬃciency. We shall clarify this issue by
investigating the implications of each of the three progressively stronger Bayesian consis-
tency requirements, compatibility, full compatibility, and rectangularity, we introduced
in Section 2. We begin by characterizing ex ante eﬃciency of zero endowments. Consider
the trivial partition Πi = {Ω},a n dl e tΦi be the FB-updating on Pi ∈ P. Then, as an
immediate corollary of Proposition 2, we have the following characterization of ex ante
eﬃciency of zero endowments, which can be regarded as a special case of Billot et al.
(2000):5
Corollary 5 The following conditions are equivalent: (i)
T
i∈I co(Pi) 6= ∅; (ii) there
exists no {fi ∈ RΩ}i∈I with
P
i∈I fi =0such that E0
i fi > 0 for all i ∈ I.
For the case of a single prior, this result is reduced to the trivial fact that the agents
agree to trade ex ante if and only if they disagree about the likelihood of the states; that
is, no trade is ex ante eﬃcient if and only if the players have the same prior.
First, suppose that Pi is compatible but not fully compatible with Φi. Then, we can
easily construct an example of ex ante eﬃcient trade which is not interim eﬃcient, even
5Diﬀerent from our result, Billot et al. (2000) considered strictly risk averse traders and assumed
convex sets of priors. For the issue of ex ante agreeable trade, see also Kajii and Ui (2004a).
13if every agent has a common prior set. If every agent has a common prior set, then zero
t r a d ei se xa n t ee ﬃcient by Corollary 5. But if Pi is not fully compatible, we may have
T
i∈I co(P∗
i )=∅, as we discussed in Section 4.1, and thus zero trade may not be interim
eﬃcient. See Example 2 in Section 5.
Second, suppose that Pi is fully compatible with Φi. If a constant trade is ex ante
eﬃcient, then it is interim eﬃcient. That is, dynamic consistency holds for constant
trade arrangements. To see this, look at (i) of Lemma 3, which says that if an interim
improvement over constant is possible for all agents, then an ex ante improvement is
possible. Note that the role of constant trade is similar to that discussed in Section 4.2,
and that the eﬃciency of constant trade implies
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅ by Corollary 4. Thus,
ex ante eﬃciency implies interim eﬃciency only when
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅.
Finally, suppose that Pi is rectangular with Φi. Then, as is pointed out by Epstein
and Schneider (2003) and Wakai (2002), the ex ante eﬃciency does imply the interim
eﬃciency for any trade arrangements. That is, dynamic consistency holds for any trade
arrangements. We state it formally for completeness:
Lemma 5 Suppose that Pi is rectangular for all i ∈ I.I f{fi}i∈I ∈ T is ex ante eﬃcient
in T,t h e ni ti si n t e r i me ﬃcient in T.











q (πi),r i(·|πi) ∈ arg min
p∈Φi(πi)
p · fi






i (π)ri(·|πi) ∈ Pi.
This implies that p0
i ∈ argminp∈Pi p · fi, and hence E0
i fi =
P
ω∈Ω Eifi(ω) × q∗
i (ω). So if
{fi}i∈I ∈ T is ex ante eﬃcient, then it is interim eﬃcient.
Based upon the above observation, Proposition 2 can be re-interpreted as follows.
Recall that P∗
i is the maximal rectangular prior set. If P∗
i is taken as though it is the set
of priors for agent i, the condition
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅ holds if and only if zero endowment
is ex ante eﬃcient by Corollary 5. By Lemma 5, if zero endowment is ex ante eﬃcient,
then it is interim eﬃcient because P∗
i is fully compatible with Φi.
145E x a m p l e s
In this section, we provide examples which clarify the meaning of concepts and results
in the paper.
Example 1
This example is intended to illustrate the diﬀerences among the consistency requirements
for prior sets, compatibility, full compatibility, and rectangularity as well as the maximal








2),(1,0,0)} is compatible but is not fully compatible with Φi
since the posterior of (1,0,0) given {1,2} is not included in Φi ({1,2}).





2)} is fully compatible. The set P0
i,h o w e v e r ,i s




2(0,0,1) is not in P0







2,0) ∈ Φi ({1,2}), (0,0,1) ∈ Φi ({3}).






2)} is fully compatible and rectangular.













• Let f ∈ RΩ be such that f =( −1,2,1). Then, Eif (1) = Eif (2) = 1
2 and
Eif (3) = 1. For Pi, E0
i f = −1, but for P0
i, E0
i f = 1
2,c o n ﬁrming (i) of Lemma 3.
• Let f ∈ RΩ be such that f =( 1 ,2,−1). For P00
i , E0
i f = 1
4 > 0, but Eif (3) = −1.
On the other hand, for P∗
i ,E 0
i f = −1 < 0, conﬁrming (ii) of Lemma 3.
Example 2
As we discussed in Section 4.1, if there exists a common prior set and posterior functions
are derived from the FB-updating, then the condition of Proposition 2 is satisﬁed. This
may not be the case if posterior functions are derived from the ML-updating. The
following example illustrates this observation.
15Let Ω = {1,2,3,4}, I = {1,2}, Π1 = {{1,2},{3,4}}, Π2 = {{1,3},{2,4}}. Consider
P1 = P2 =
½














, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
¾
.
Let Φi be the ML-updating on Pi for i =1 ,2. Thus, Pi is compatible with Φi for
i =1 ,2. Then, we can show that co(P∗
1) ∩ co(P∗
2)=∅. To see this, calculate {1} =
argmaxt∈[0,1] pt ({1,2}), {0} =a r g m a x t∈[0,1] pt ({3,4}), {0} =a r g m a x t∈[0,1] pt ({1,3}),
{1} =a r gm a x t∈[0,1] pt ({2,4}). Let E = {1,4}. Then,
min
p∈Φ1(Π1(ω))

















Let Ω = {1,2,3}, I = {1,2},a n dΠ1 = Π2 = {Ω}.L e tP1 = {(1,0,0),(0, 1
2, 1
2)} and P2 =
{(0,1,0),(1
2,0, 1
2)}.L e tΦi be the FB-updating on Pi for i =1 ,2. Clearly,
T






i∈I co(Pi) 6= ∅. Thus, by Lemma 4, we must have
T
i∈I co(P∗
i ) 6= ∅.
Example 4




∅ b u tt h e r ea r et r a d ea r r a n g e m e n t s{fi}∈I and {gi}∈I such that Eifi(ω) >E igi(ω)f o r
all ω ∈ Ω, i ∈ I.
Let I = {1,2} and consider a state space Ω = {1,2,3a,3b,4a,4b} where the players
have assigned probability 0.2 to the events {1} and {2} and probability 0.3t ot h ee v e n t s
{3a,3b} and {4a,4b}, respectively. The diﬀerence between state 3a and state 3b and
that between 4a and 4b are ambiguous in the sense that the players do not know how
the probabilities assigned to {3a,3b} and {4a,4b} should be allocated to these states.
Thus the players have a common set of priors, which is:
P1 = P2 = {p ∈ ∆(Ω):p({1})=p({2})=0 .2,p ({3a,3b})=p({4a,4b})=0 .3}.
The private information of players are given by the following partition.
Π1 = {{1,3a,3b},{2,4a,4b}}, Π2 = {{1,3a,4a},{2,3b,4b}}.
16Let Φi be the FB-updating on Pi for i =1 ,2. We have:
Φ1({1,3a,3b})= {p ∈ ∆(Ω):p({1})=0 .4,p ({3a,3b})=0 .6},




























where x ∈ [0,0.3], y ∈ [0,0.3]
¾
.
Let E = {1,2}. Note that the updated probabilities of E are:
{p(E)|p ∈ Φ1(Π1(ω))} = {0.4}, {p(E)|p ∈ Φ2(Π2(ω))} =[ 0 .25,1]
for all ω ∈ Ω. Consider trade arrangements {fi}i∈I and {gi}i∈I such that f1(ω)=
−f2(ω)=−1i fω ∈ E and f1(ω)=−f2(ω)=1o t h e r w i s e ,a n dgi(ω)=−fi(ω) for all
ω ∈ Ω and i =1 ,2. Then, E1f1(ω)=m i n p∈{0.4} p · (−1) + (1 − p) · 1=0 .2, E1g1(ω)=
minp∈{0.4} p·1+(1−p)·(−1) = −0.2, E2f2(ω)=m i n p∈[0.25,1] p·1+(1−p)·(−1) = −0.5,
and E2g2(ω)=m i n p∈[0.25,1] p · (−1) + (1 − p) · 1=−1. Thus, E1f1(ω) >E 1g1(ω)a n d




Aumann, R. J., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Ann. Statist. 4, 1236—1239.
Billot, A., Chateauneuf, A., Gilboa, I., Tallon, J.- M., 2000. Sharing beliefs: between
agreeing and disagreeing. Econometrica 68, 685—694.
Dow, J., Madrigal, V., Werlang, S., 1990. Preference, common knowledge, and specula-
tive trade. Working paper.
Epstein, L. G., Schneider, M., 2003. Recursive multiple priors. J. Econ. Theory 113,
1—31.
17Feinberg, Y., 2000. Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors. J. Econ.
Theory 91, 127—179.
Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D., 1989. Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior. J. Math.
Econ. 18, 141—153.
Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D., 1993. Updating ambiguous beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 59, 33—49.
Grant, S., Kajii, A., Polak, B., 2000. Decomposable choice under uncertainty. J. Econ.
Theory 92, 169—197.
Kajii, A., Ui, T., 2004a. Agreeable bets with multiple priors. KIER Working Paper 581,
Kyoto University.
Kajii, A., Ui, T., 2004b. Incomplete information games with multiple priors. KIER
Working Paper 583, Kyoto University.
Halevy, Y., 2004. The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent
agents. Games Econ. Behav. 46, 189—198.
Harsanyi, J., 1967—68. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players.
Parts I, II, III, Management Sci. 14, 159—182, 320—334, 486—502.
Ma, C., 2001. No trade theorem under Knightian uncertainty with general preferences.
Theory Dec. 51, 173—181.
Milgrom, P., Stokey, N., 1999. Information, trade and common knowledge. J. Econ.
Theory 59, 17—27.
Morris, S., 1995. Trade with heterogenous prior beliefs and asymmetric information.
Econometrica 62, 132—142.
Ng, M.-C., 2003. On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands. J. Econ.
Theory 109, 39—51.
Samet, D., 1998. Common priors and separation of convex sets. Games Econ. Behav. 24,
172—174.
Wakai, K., 2003. Conditions for dynamic consistency and no-trade under multiple priors.
Working paper.
18